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THE WISDOM OF SOFT JUDICIAL POWER:
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, CONCURRING
Samuel Estreicher*
Tristan Pelham- Webb**
President Theodore Roosevelt believed in talking softly
while carrying a big stick. 1 Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., who
served on the Court from 1972 to 1987 after a distinguished career in private practice, also talked softy but wielded a great deal
of influence without using a stick, and sometimes just by agreeing with the majority. Branzburg v. Hayes is perhaps the clearest
example. Writing for a five-person majority (that included Powell), Justice Byron White refused to create a First Amendment
privilege for newsmen, rejecting the argument that the burden
on news gathering created by grand jury subpoena was sufficient
to override the "public interest in law enforcement." 2 White
thereby declined the opportunity to create a First Amendment
privilege for newsmen seeking to shield their sources, a privilege
not available to other citizens.
Dwight D. Opperman Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Opperman Institute of Judicial Administration. NYU School of Law. Professor Estreicher clerked for
Justice Powell during the 1977-78 Term.
** Graduate of the Class of 2009. New York University School of Law and author
of Powe/ling for Precedent: "Binding'' Concurrences. N.Y.U. ANN. SUR. AM. L. (forthcoming 2009).
We are not offering here an overall assessment of Justice Powell's jurisprudence.
Such ground has been well tread. See, e.g.. Paul W. Kahn. The Court, the Community and
the Judicial Balance: The Jurisprudence of Justice Powell. 97 YALE L.J. 1. 9 (1987) (critical of Powell's "representative balancing"): William D. Bader. The Jurisprudence of Justice Powell, Jr.. in GREAT JUSTICES OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: RATINGS AND CASE
STUDIES. 305-{)8 (William D. Pederson & Norman W. Provizer eds .. 1993) (generally
supportive of Powell's approach): Jacob W. Landynski. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.: Balance Wheel of the Court, in THE BURGER COURT: POLITICAL AND JUDICIAL PROFILES
311 (Charles M. Lamb & Stephen C. Halpern eds .. 1991) (noting that Powell was "the
justice most often in the majority in close 5-4 decisions throughout the 1980s). Our focus
is somewhat narrower-only on an aspect of his jurisprudential role: his ability to influence the path of the law through his concurrences.
·
I. Letter from Theodore Roosevelt to Henry L. Spraug (Jan. 26. 1900) (on file
with the Library of Congress). available at http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/treasures/images/
at0052as.jpg.
2. Branz burg v. Hayes. 408 U.S. 665. 690 ( 1972).
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While joining the majority opinion, Justice Powell also
penned a short separate concurrence to "'emphasize ... the limited nature of the Court's holding."' Attempting to cabin the
Court's opinion to the facts of the case, Powell proposed a caseby-case balancing test that would take into account the First
Amendment interests as well as the public interest in ensuring
truthful testimony during grand jury inquiries. Powell agreed
with White that bad-faith prosecutions seeking information from
the press would not be tolerated, but went further, stating that
"'the courts will be available to newsmen under circumstances
where legitimate First Amendment interests require protection."~

Despite his having joined a majority opinion that seemingly
rejected the creation of a First Amendment newsmen's privilege.
Powell's separate opinion actually spurred recognition of a
'"qualified reporter's privilege" in many subsequent lower court
cases.' Many of these courts reasoned that because Powell cast
the "'deciding" vote to create the majority, his analysis stands as
that of the Court."
True to his role as a vital center of the Court, Branzburg
was not the only case where Justice Powell took steps to cast the
majority opinion in a different, more restrained light. Indeed,
Powell often preferred a short concurring opinion as the means
of expressing his differences with a majority rationale. While
many of his contemporaries may have preferred the clarity of a
dissent, Powell sought both agreement and the benefits of signaling a potentially limiting rationale in future cases by simultaneously purporting to join the majority rationale, while often stat7
ing what he saw as the "limited nature" of the holding, or why
the Court was right in "this case."~
Embracing one's differences in a concurring opinion is certainly not the only way a Justice can approach those differences.
Dissents are. of course, a good deal more common. A dissent can
3. /d. at 709 (Powell. J.. concurring).
4. /d. at 710.
5. See, e.g .. In re Selcraig. 705 F.2d 789, 792 (5th Cir. 1983) (construing Branzburg
as a plurality opinion. and finding a qualified privilege); Zenrilli v. Smith. 656 F.2d 705
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (limiting Branzburg to the criminal context and explaining that Powell's
test should govern in the civil context); Riley v. City of Chester. 612 F.2d 708. 715-16 (3d
Cir. 1979) (noting that Powell cast the deciding fifth vote in Branzburg and adopting his
test for a journalist's privilege).
6. Zenri/li. 656 F.2d at 711.
7. Branz burg. 408 U.S. at 709 (Powell.J.. concurring).
8. South Dakota v. Opperman. 428 U.S. 364.376 (1976) (Powell. J.. concurring).
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aim at two different goals. First, a Justice may dissent along the
lines of Justice Harlan in Plessy v. Ferguson, noting that the
Court had made a grave error in approving "separate but equal"
laws and urging future decisionmakers to hold such laws inconsistent with the Constitution." In this way. the Justice implores a
future jurist or lawmaker to find that the decision of the day was
wrong and that a different result should be reached. Harlan
proved prescient by the time of Brown v. Board of Education.w
11
Second, a Justice may write a passionate dissent-a geshrei
of sorts-aimed at arousing public interest in the issue and hopefully spurring a popular response to the Court's seemingly obvious mistake. This can be done either for the purpose of securing
congressional action, as may have been Justice Ginsburg's goal
1
in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., ' or to prompt constitutional amendment as Justice Iredell's words in Chisholm v.
13
Georgia led to the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment. Such
opinions are often described as "passionate'' and may be seen as
''chastising" the majority for its decision on the particular issue.
This approach cannot be used in every case of disagreement because its effect depends on the probability of securing a popular
response and it requires a weighing of the costs of diminishing
political capital with one's colleagues.
Typically, where a Justice joins the majority opinion, it is
the majority, and not the concurring, opinion. that constitutes
precedent for future decisions. Of course. where there is a rule
there is an exception, and this rule is, well, no exception. Powell's concurrence in Branzburg is one example, but so, too, is
Justice Robert Jackson's famous concurrence in The Steel Sei4
zure Case/ or Justice Felix Frankfurter's concurrence in Brown
1
v. A/len. ' So naturally, this is not a new phenomenon-rare,
perhaps, but certainly not new.
9. Plessy v. Ferguson. 163 U.S. 537. 559. 564 ( 1896) (Harlan. J.. dissenting).
10. 347 u.s. 483 (1954).
11. Yiddish for a kind of emotional outburst.
12. 127 S. Ct. 2162. 2178 (2007) (Ginsburg. J.. dissenting). Congress amended the
antidiscrimination laws to implement Justice Ginsburg's criticism. See Lilly Ledbetter
Fair Pay Act of 2009. Pub. L. No. 112-2. 123 Stat. 5 (2009).
13. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419. 429 (1793) (Opinion of Iredell.J.).
14. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer. 343 U.S. 579. 635-38 (1952) (Jackson. J.. concurring). Jackson concurred both in the judgment of the Court and in the
opinion of the Court penned by Justice Black.
15. 344 U.S. 443. 488. 73 S. Ct. 437 (1953) (Opinion of Frankfurter. J.). Justice
Frankfurter concurred in Justice Reed's lead opinion. but only insofar as it addressed the
effects of a denial of certiorari on a future federal district court's consideration of an applicant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He dissented from the rest of Reed's opin-
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What is unusual about Justice Powell, however, is the frequency with which he utilized the approach. Over the 1975-1980
period, Powell wrote 91 concurring opinions. Of those concurring opinions, twelve, or roughly 13.2%, were invoked by later
courts as stating the holding of the Court. Of his contemporary
brethren, Powell had the largest number of concurrences, and
the highest ratio of concurrences to dissents-evincing his clear
preference for establishing his differences in a concurring opin•

lOll.

16

The chart below shows the breakdown of Powell's preference for concurrence as compared with his peers:
Opinion and Voting Trends in the Suprem! Court Term; 1975-1980
Opinions Written
Justice Of the CourtConcurrillj! Dissent C/D ratic
8-3
Bladcrnun
81
1.192
Brennan
82
122
0.426
52
Burger
93
45
41
1.098
()
Douglas•
l.(J(J(J
1
1
o.rs
~l:mhall
84
108
30
Powell
91
89
"4
1.230
w- Ll.336
Rchnqu1st
91
36
-6
-2
124
0.581
Sten:ns
9(1
Ste-.1·arr
0.535
86
46
-o u.-oo
91
49
\\hire
Per Curiam
84
-

-

Total

861

509

806

-

Dissenting Votes
Joining Majority
Total Opinion Mem. Total W/ o opinion %joined
61-1.6611 \1
241
124
33
15"
256
282
464
63
345
53.89' "
-95
92.33" ,,
21
F9
16
5
2
1
3
2
- -----·---341
491J
222
282
59
56.91"·•
-4.&J',,
1111
254
26
126
644
26"
64.81" ,,
201
66
558
234
64.46",,
231
n n
61
555
-2.-l"n
155
34
189
626
222
-6.19""
210
124
32
156
656
84

-

-

-

21"6

1456

380

1836

-

-

-

-

•Jusoa:: Douglas retired due to illness on :\orember 12, 19"5. Bec!use he cast a mte in onlrfourcases dunng
the 19-5 Term, his statistic; are ignored for pmposes of mmparison to J ustia:: Powell during the 19-5-1981.1 Terms.

A Justice can either concur in both rationale and judgment
with the majority, or just in the judgment, before they write
separately. The concurrence rate mentioned above includes both
categories. The more interesting instances are naturally where
the Justice signs on to the majority opinion in both judgment and

ion.
16. Powell concurred 91 times and dissented 74 times. giving him a ratio of 1.230.
Justice Blackmun was the next closest. concurring 87 times and dissenting 73 times. for a
ratio of 1.192. The statistics used for these numbers were compiled from the Harvard
Law Review"s Annual Supreme Court Review and encompassed the 1975 through 1980
Terms. beginning with 90 HARV. L. REV. 56. 276-82 (1976) through 95 HARV. L. REV.
91. 339-45 (1981 ).
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rationale, but then concurs in a separate opinion, and-a Ia
Branz burg- that separate opinion is read by later courts to establish the binding rationale.
THE VARIETIES OF JUSTICE POWELL'S INFLUENCE
1. CONCURRING WITH THE MAJORITY AND WRITING
SEPARATELY

Powell's Branzburg opinion stands out as perhaps the most
striking example of where despite joining the majority's opinion.
a Justice's concurrence has been viewed with precedential
weight in the subsequent decisions of the lower courts. But there
are others.
One characteristic of Justice Powell's jurisprudence is his
preference to "balance'' competing interests in constitutional
cases. 17 This concern for "balance" came through in Branzburg,
and also later in Kelley v. Johnson. 1x In the latter case, ruling on a
challenge to a county's ordinance regulating the grooming standards for its police force, Justice Rehnquist for the Court stated
that while there was a constitutional interest at stake, the challenger bore the burden of showing that there was no rational relationship between the ordinance and the public interest in police safety. In a brief concurring opinion, Justice Powell noted
that "no negative implication ... with respect to a liberty interest
within the Fourteenth Amendment'' could be found in the majority s opinion, and that "there must be a weighing of the degree of infringement of the individual's liberty interest against
the need for the regulation. " ~
Courts in at least three circuits have cited with approval
Powell's "no negative implication" language in cases dealing
with regulations aimed at personal grooming standards. In Doe
v. Houston, the court stated that "Justice Powell's concurring
opinion in Kelley is the view shared by this Court, that 'no negative implication' as to the more general liberty interest in personal appearance is to be drawn from the Kelley majority opin20
ion. " Similarly, the Second Circuit stated that Powell's Kelley
1

17. William D. Bader. The Jurisprudence of Jusrice Powell. Jr.. in GREAT JL'STICES
OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: RATINGS AND CASE STL:DIES 305-08 (William D. Pederson & Norman W. Provizer eds .. 1993).
18. 425 U.S. 238 (1976).
19. !d. at 249 (Powell. J.. concurring).
20. 489 F. Supp. 76.80 (S.D. Tex. !980).
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concurrence "reinforces the view we share that 'no negative implication' as to the more general liberty interest in personal appearance" arises from Rehnquist's opinion. 21 There, the court
undertook a rather lengthy balancing approach, exploring "the
individual interests at stake" and "the state's countervailing interests" before reaching the conclusion that the challenged ordinance was "one of those purposeless restraints to which Mr. Justice Harlan referred." 22 The Northern District of Georgia has
similarly employed Powell's balancing approach in Nalley v.
Douglas County, invoking Powell's "no negative implication''
language and finding a regulation on the facial hair of roadside
workers ''so unconnected to any legitimate state goal'' that it was
unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiff in a§ 1983 action. 21
Interestingly. Kelley was decided by a vote of 6-2; thus,
Powell's vote was not necessary to the formation of a majority,
as it was in Branzburg. Some lower courts nevertheless referred
to Powell's position as "casting the deciding vote" as a basis for
their adoption of his reasoning. 24 This is a testament to Justice
Powell's influence, whatever the merits of the underlying reasoning of the lower courts.
Powell's vote in Herbert v. Lando was similarly not necessary to create a majority opinion." Decided by a 6-3 margin,
Lando addressed whether press protection was available under
the First and Fourteenth Amendments during the discovery
process when a member of the press was sued for defamation.
Justice White's opinion for the Court flatly refused to recognize
First Amendment limitations to discovery of the editorial process. By contrast, Justice Powell, concurring, stressed that in applying the rules of discovery, the trial judge should take into account the First Amendment interests of the press in
"measur[ing] the degree of relevance required in light of both
the private needs of the parties and the public concerns implicated."'" Noting a concern that the discovery process could be

21. East Hartford Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ. of East Hartford. 562 F.2d 838.
841 (2d Cir. 1977).
22. /d. at 846 (internal citation omitted).
23. 498 F. Supp. 1228. 1230 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
24. See, e.g.. Riley v. City of Chester. 612 F.2d 708. 716 (3d Cir. 1979).
25. Herbert v. Lando. 441 U.S. 153. 154 (1979). Justice White's majority opinion
gained the votes of the Chief Justice and Justices Blackmun. Rehnquist. and Stevens. in
addition to Powell. Thus. even if Powell had chosen to dissent. the case would have stood
with a 5-4 majority supporting White's opinion.
26. /d. at 179 (Powell. J.. concurring).
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abused in libel cases against the media. Powell urged courts to
supervise the process against the risk of abuse.
Even though Powell's vote was not necessary to the Lando
majority, his balancing approach has carried the day. In a defamation suit against Merrell Dow. the D.C. Circuit remanded part
of the appeal to the district court, urging it to limit discovery "to
the extent feasible to those questions that may sustain summary
judgment." In so doing, the court noted Powell's Lando concurrence and the district court's "duty to consider First Amendment
2
interests as well as the private interests of the plaintiff. " - N umerous district courts have similarly relied on Powell's concurrence. The district court for the Southern District of New York
noted that "we must carefully balance the plaintiffs' interest in
the requested discovery with the First Amendment interests
sought to be protected." 2' In denying a plaintiffs request for an
order compelling the appearance of the AFL-CIO in a deposition, the district court for the District of Columbia noted that
"the first amendment interests delineated in . . . Herbert v.
2
Lando ... compel denial of plaintiffs discovery request. " y The
court noted that the inquiry into the political activities of the
AFL-CIO would impinge on the organization's First Amendment interests, and that counseled against a finding that their
appearance would be relevant in discovery.
Powell took care to preface his opinion in Lando by stating
that "I do not see my observations as being inconsistent with the
Court's opinion." 30 This gloss may have encouraged lower courts
to adopt his position in evaluating the relevance of certain discovery requests. Interestingly. the conflict between the majority
and Powell in Lando was similar to the conflict in Branzburg: in
each case, the majority rejected the application of any absolute
First Amendment privilege against inquiry into certain press activities, and in each case, Powell noted that the First Amendment interests should be taken into account in the appropriate
balance.
Also decided by a 6-3 margin was Monell v. Department of
Social Services, addressing municipal liability under what is now
42 U.S.C. § 1983, initially enacted as part of the 1871 Civil Rights

27.
28.
29.
30.

McBride v. Merrell Dow & Pharms .. Inc .. 717 F.2d 1460. 1467 (D.C. Cir. 1983 ).
Rosario v. New York Times. Co .. 84 F.R.D. 626.631 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
Walther v. Fed. Election Comm·n. 82 F.R.D. 200. 202 (D.D.C. 1979).
Lando. 441 U.S. at 177-78 (Powell. 1.. concurring).
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31

Act. Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, revisited the
Court's decision in Monroe v. Pape regarding municipal immunity to suit arising from § 1983 violations. Concluding that the
Monroe Court had misread the legislative history surrounding
the enactment of § 1983, Brennan concluded "that Congress did
intend municipalities and other local government units to be included among those persons to whom § 1983 applies." 32 Under
the majority's rationale, municipalities could be held liable for
their policy decisions but could not be held liable for actions of
its agents in violation of those policies.
Possibly concerned that the majority had left the door open
to a Bivens-type implied cause of action against municipalities
that would not be limited to policy decisions, Justice Powell
wrote a concurrence addressing this concern. First roundly approving of the Court's examination of the legislative history and
its narrowing of the reach of Monroe, Powell went on to address
"the question whether we should, by analogy to our decision in
Bivens, imply a cause of action directly from the Fourteenth
Amendment which would not be subject to the limitations contained in § 1983. ,,, Noting that a factor in the inquiry would be
whether. in the absence of congressional authorization of municipal liability, persons injured by the unconstitutional official
policies of a city would need the backstop provision of some
other remedy, Powell tried to preempt judicial recognition of an
implied cause of action in addition to § 1983 liability by suggesting that a Bivens-type action against municipalities could not coexist with § 1983 municipal liability. Thus, he stated: "Rather
than constitutionalize a cause of action against local government
that Congress intended to create in 1871, the better course is to
confess error and set the record straight, as the Court does today. " 3-l
Here, too. the Powell concurrence has influenced the path
of the law, as lower courts, picking up on its reasoning, have
made reference to the availability of § 1983 municipal liability as
an important factor counseling against a constitutional cause of
action. Directly following Justice Powell's rationale in Monell,
the federal court for the District of Vermont dismissed a plaintiffs cause of action under the Fourteenth Amendment against a

31.
32.
33.
34.

436 U.S. 658.660 (1978).
!d. at 690 (emphasis deleted).
!d. at 712 (Powell. J .. concurring) (internal quotation and citation omitted).
!d. at 713.
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municipality because the plaintiff had already established a
cause of action under § 1983. The court noted that although the
question was not squarely presented for decision in Monell, Justice Powell's concurrence addressed the contention. Similarly the
Second Circuit has followed Powell's guidance.'' as have district
courts within the First Circuit.'h
In each of these cases, Powell purported to join the majority
opinion in full- both its judgment and rationale- and yet chose
to write a separate opinion to preserve his view of the issues.
Moreover, Powell's vote here was not necessary to create a
"Court," as contrasted with Branzburg.
2. A "NARROW-GROUND" CONCURRENCE IN THE
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

Plurality opinions were a rare thing in the early history of
the Supreme Court-so rare, in fact, that fewer than forty-five of
37
them were handed down between 1800 and 1956. Since then,
they have become a fairly frequent occurrence. complicating the
ability of lower courts and practitioners to determine what a majority of the Justices had agreed on in a particular case. The
Court tried to give some direction to the lower courts in Marks
v. United States, where it stated that in the plurality context ''the
holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by
those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds."'~ In such an instance, if no five-Justice majority of
the Court agrees on one point of law, and one Justice files a con-

35. Ohland v. City of Montpelier. 467 F. Supp. 324. 348 (D. Vt. 1979) (citing precedent of the Second Circuit in Turpin v. Maliet. 591 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1979). and of the
Fourth Circuit in Cale v. City of Covington. 586 F.2d 311 (4th Cir. 1978)).
36. See Leite v. City of Providence. 463 F. Supp. 585. 587-88 (D.R.I. 1978) (noting
that Powell had "mentioned that little reason now existed for resorting to a Bivens-type
cause of action"): DeVasto v. Faherty. 479 F. Supp. 1069. 1071 (D. Ma. 1979) (reading
Powell's concurrence in Monell to supplement the First Circuit decision in Kotska v.
Hogg. 560 F.2d 37 (1st Cir. 1977). and granting summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs constitutional claim). But see DiMaggio v. O'Brien. 497 F. Supp. 870. 876 (E.D. Pa.
1980) (describing Powell's rejection of a constitutional cause of action against a municipality as dictum. and expressing concern for the gap created by a rejection of both respondeat superior liability and constitutionalliabilitv).
37. John F. Davis & William L. Reynolds. Ju~idical Cripples: Pluralitv Opinions in
the Supreme Court, 1974 DUKE L.J. 59. 60 (1974) (citing Comment. Supreme Court NoClear Majority Decisions: A Study in Stare Decisis. 24 U. CHI. L. REV. 99.99 (1956)). The
Chicago Law Review Comment does not cite to any authority for this proposition. but
the Davis and Reynolds article refers to the Comment as "an analytical study of plurality
decisions ... /d. at 60 n.l.
38. Marks v. United States. 430 U.S. 188. 193 ( 1977) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia. 428
U.S. 153. 169 n.15 (1976) (Opinion of Stewart. Powell. and Stevens. JJ.)).
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curring opinion that is logically narrower than any of the other
opinions, the narrower opinion is seen to carry the "holding" of
the Court. Such an approach gives undeniable weight to the Justice who authors the concurring opinion which proves to be narrower. Not surprisingly, the author of the Court's opinion in
Marks was Justice Powell.
The "narrowest-grounds" approach has attracted some
19
criticism, even from the Court itself. However, much of that
criticism seems to stem from the fact that it has been applied in
situations in which the concurring opinion is not truly "narrower"' than its companion plurality opinion.
One example of Powell's impact via application of the "narrowest-grounds" approach was in Robbins v. Ca/ifornia.4() Writing for a four-Justice plurality, Justice Stewart laid down a
bright-line rule that any warrantless search of containers found
in an automobile was per se unreasonable. Powell, concurring in
the judgment, declined to join in the formulation of the brightline rule, instead claiming that a court should determine whether
or not the defendant had "manifested a reasonable expectation
of privacy in the contents of the container. " 41 Powell listed a set
of factors that would be relevant to this inquiry, and rejected the
plurality's bright-line rule as merely promoting simplicity at the
expense of Fourth Amendment protections.
Because Robbins was a 4-1-1-3 decision (Chief Justice Burger concurred in the judgment without opinion), there was no
governing rationale on which five Justices agreed. When the
Second Circuit was confronted with the container-search issue in
United States v. Martino. it invoked the ''narrowest-grounds" approach of Marks to construe the holding of Robbins. Although
the Court had never fully explained what was meant by ''narrowest-grounds," the appeals court interpreted it "as referring to
the ground that is most nearly confined to the precise fact situation before the Court, rather than to a ground that states more
general rules." 4' Thus, because Powell's opinion could reasonably be construed as "narrower'' than the plurality's-a rule holding that this container could not validly be searched being narrower than a rule holding that no container could validly be
searched-the Second Circuit adopted his reasoning as the true

39.
40.
41.
42.

See, e.g .. Nichols v. United States. 511 U.S. 738.745-46 (1994).
453 U.S. 420 (1981 ).
/d. at 434 n.3 (Powell. J.. concurring in the judgment).
United States v. Martino. 604 F.2d 860.872-73 (2d Cir. 1981).
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holding of Robbins.~' The Texas Court of Appeals has taken a
similar line of reasoning in finding Powell's approach to be the
binding force behind Robbins.~
Powell was able to retain influence through his concurring
opinions even when he did not join the majority, and, in fact,
even when the "narrowest-grounds" approach would have been
technically inapplicable. Take, for instance, his opinion in Goldberg v. United States.~' Justice Brennan authored the opinion for
the Court which interpreted a provision of the Jencks Ad" as
creating a per se rule requiring an in camera examination of
prosecutorial notes made during the pre-hearing interview of a
witness in every case where it was requested. Justice Powell,
concurring in the judgment, expressly disagreed with this part of
the majority opinion, noting that "had the trial judge ruled that
Newman's testimony was insufficient to justify further inquiry,
rather than relying on the 'work product' privilege, I would have
affirmed the denial of Goldberg's motion."~ Instead, Powell
claimed, the defendant must meet a threshold burden of providing "probative evidence" showing that he is entitled to the
statements under the Act before a trial judge should grant any
motion for production.
Although Brennan's opinion was joined by seven Justices,
and Justice Powell's opinion garnered only the assent of Chief
Justice Burger, lower courts have relied on his refusal to require
an in camera hearing in every instance. The Fourth Circuit, in
United States v. Maryland and Virginia Milk Producers Cooperative Association, Inc., cited at length a passage in Justice Powell's
Goldberg concurrence, and then noted that "an in camera inspection is not per se required."~ There, the court found relevant
the fact that no basis had been established for production of the
notes, and that to allow an in camera inspection "would be akin
to sanctioning a fishing expedition. "~ Similarly, the Fifth Circuit
has held that an in camera inspection is not required in every
case where a Jencks Act issue arises, citing as one reason Pow7

9

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

/d. at 873.
See Adams v. State. 634 S.W.2d 785. 792 n.4 (Tex. App. 1982).
425U.S.94(1976).
18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1970).
Goldberg. 425 U.S. at 117 (Powell. 1.. concurring in the judgment).
1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 22748 at *34 (4th Cir. Sept. 15. 1992).
/d. at * 35.
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ell's concern that to do so would be to sanction the delay of the
trial for resolution of unnecessary collateral issues."'

***
The foregoing shows Justice Powell's consistent use of concurring opinions as a conduit for differentiation from majority
opinions. This history shows the wisdom of soft judicial powerthat at least some Justices may be able to achieve greater influence by limiting the scope of disagreement with the majority
rather than writing for a broader audience. This was certainly
the approach (and which enhanced the influence) of Justice
Powell. We have described six Powell concurrences that have
been treated by lower courts as stating the holding of the Court,
even where Powell's vote was not necessary to form a majority.
In another piece, one of us has shown that nearly 15% of the
concurring opinions Powell authored during the 1975-1980
Terms were used by later courts as stating the effective holding
1
of Supreme Court precedent.' This is an aspect of Justice Powell's jurisprudence that remains understudied and underappreciated in the legal community, and suggests useful lessons for
members of the present Court.

50. United States v. Osgood. 794 F.2d 1087.1091-92 (5th Cir. 1986).
51. Tristan Pelham-Webb. Powelling for Precedent: "Binding" Concurrences.
N.Y.U. ANN. SL·R. AM. L. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 1 n.8. on file with author).

